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PROSECUTORS AND THE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CASES:
AN ANALYSIS OF PLEA BARGAINING RATES
J. B. JONESINTRODUCTION

Increasing crime rates generate considerable
public concern over the performance of the criminal justice system. Many citizens would be shocked
to learn that the system operates on the basis of
mutual cooperation and consultation, rather than
the media image of the strident prosecutor battling
a committed defense attorney. The actual operation of the American system of criminal justice is
vastly different from the ideal adversary system.
The reality is bureaucratic bargaining.! Approximately ninety percent of all criminal cases are
resolved through the2 process of pre-trial negotiation
or plea bargaining.
Plea bargaining results from an agreement between the prosecutor, defense attorney, and ocrasionally the defendant. The prosecutor offers the
defendant a quid pro quo (charge reduction or sentence recommendation) for pleading guilty. Plea
bargaining is a low visability process, one which
occurs in a private and informal setting. Decisions
are made over lunch or in the hallway of the
criminal court building. Moreover, the participants
wield such discretion that in most cases they serve
as the final arbiters in the sentencing decision.
The practice of plea bargaining has created considerable controversy. Various study groups such
as the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and the American Bar
Association have endorsed the practice, although
recommending certain reforms. 3 However, other
groups, specifically the Nixon Administration's National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, have argued for the abolition
of plea bargaining.' Given the prevalence of the
*
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practice, as well as the widespread disagreement
over its use, plea bargaining merits further study
and research.5 This study examines the effect of a
prosecutor's values and social background on his
rate of plea bargaining. The findings presented
here are based on a mail survey of prosecuting6
attorneys and their assistants in the state of Illinois.
The survey instrument contained both open-ended
and closed questions focusing primarily on the
prosecutor's plea bargaining practices and his view
of these procedures. Respondents were also asked
to supply biographical data.
The Dependent Variable
Prosecutors' responses to a question on rate of
plea bargaining provided the dependent variable
for this study. Prosecutors were requested to indicate the percentage of their cases which were resolved through the use of a negotiated plea and the
dependent variable is based on the prosecutor's
perception of his plea bargaining rate. It was possible to make a crude check of the prosecutor's
veracity by comparing his reported rate of plea
negotiation with published figures on the percentage of guilty plea dispositions for his county. These
figures are included in the report of the Illinois
court administrator. Using this technique, one can
argue that the perceptions of the responding prosecutors roughly correspond to reality.
While plea bargaining is the most common mode
TICE,

STANDARDS

RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY

(1968).
5 Mulkey, The Role of the Prosecution and Defense in Plea
Bargaining,3 POL'Y STUD. J. 54 (1974).
6The
entire population (n = 350) of prosecuting
attorneys and their assistants was surveyed. The response
rate was forty-four percent (n = 156). Respondent representativeness is always a problem for researchers using
a survey research methodology. However, Larry Leslie
argues that "researchers surveying issues directly related
to homogeneous groups should not be overly concerned
about the percentage of questionnaire returns. Representativeness will most likely be excellent. This presumes,
of course, that enough responses are gained to meet
statistical assumption." Prosecutors represent a homogeneous group within the larger population. Leslie, Are
High Response Rates Essential to Valid Surveys? Soc. ScI.
RESEARCH 323-34 (1972). The questionnaires were
mailed in the summer of 1975.
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of case disposition throughout the United States,
variations do exist. Legal commentators have attributed this variability in the use of guilty pleas to
several factors. Some suggest that variations are
the result of individual differences among prosecutors. 7 For example, prosecutors often weigh such
factors as the magnitude of the crime, the adequacy
of the state's evidence, the characteristics of the
defendant, and the probable defense attorney in
order to determine the costs and benefits of plea
bargaining. Differences in each prosecutor's calculations result in variations in plea bargaining rates.
Other commentators argue that the dispositional
policies of prosecutorial offices may reflect community norms and attitudes.8 In Chicago, the prosecutor's office encourages plea bargaining, whereas
in Baltimore it does not. These differences reflect
variations in community attitudes toward criminal
justice or at least variations in the way prosecutors
perceive community attitudes. Furthermore, some
prosecutorial offices, have attempted to decrease
the disparity in the bargaining rates of assistants
through the establishment of plea bargaining policies. In Chicago, for instance, the supervising
state's attorney of the narcotics division developed
guidelines on the minimum sentence recommendation and/or charge reductions which assistant
state's attorneys could offer in narcotics cases.9
The data on variations in plea bargaining rates
suggest that further investigation is needed. By
focusing on the prosecutor's rate of plea bargaining
as the dependent variable, it will be possible to
determine how much variation in bargaining rates
is due to independent variables such as prosecutorial values and social background characteristics.
The Independent Variables

Background studies assume that the investigation of such characteristics will provide clues for
understanding decisions. This assumption is based
on the supposition that certain background characteristics and experiences are conducive to partic-

ular attitudes and values which in turn influence
behavior. Although researchers have analyzed the
relationship between background traits and the
behavior of decision-makers such as legislators, bureaucrats, and judges, they have yet to examine
this linkage in the case of prosecutors.'

0
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Gilboy, Guilty Plea Negotiations andthe Exclusionary Rule
of Evidence: A Case Study of Chicago Narcotics Courts, 65 J.
CRiM. L. & C. 89-98 (1976).
1 There are numerous studies dealing with the influ-

Two background variables which appear to influence the behavior of decision-makers are education and experience. For example, research on
social workers indicates that a formal education
can influence individual working behavior." Because common professional values are often transmitted through education, the federal Welfare Administration issued a directive in 1964 requiring
that all future public assistance workers and supervisors have college degrees. Studies also disclose
that one's career experience affects behavior. For
instance, appellate judges with prior judicial experience were less likely to inject personal values
into their decisions than their colleagues without
prior experience on the bench.12 James Q. Wilson
maintains that the difference in styles, attitudes,
and values of politicians in Chicago, California,
and New York is partially due to the difference
between "amateurs" and "professional .politicians"-differences due to experience and ambition.' 3
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Using social characteristics as independent variables indicates whether the variables which affect
the behavior of other decision-makers also exerts
an influence on prosecutors. Moreover, the discovery that common variables affect several political
phenomena facilitates the integration of research
findings.
In addition to background characteristics, another independent variable will be analyzed-the
prosecutor's support for organizational values present in the criminal court environment. Social scientists assert that the organizational pressures of
the criminal court and the personal goals of the
participants, induce prosecutors to value efficiency
in the courtroom and co-operation with colleagues.' 4 The prevalence of values such as efficiency and cooperation is conducive to the use of
plea bargaining. However, researchers must still
determine the extent to which support for these
values affects variations in reported plea bargaining rates. Using these values as independent variables allows the researcher to do so.
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prosecutors from low status or minority backgrounds might empathize with the defendants who
crowd the criminal courtrooms. Plea bargaining
provides one method of giving defendants a
"break," i.e., a reduction of charges or a favorable
sentence recommendation. Thus, prosecutors from
such backgrounds should engage in plea bargaining more frequently.
Hypothesis 1: Prosecutors from lower class or ethnic
(Blacks, Chicanos, Eastern and Southern Europeans) and
religious Uewish and Catholic) minority groups will
engage in plea bargaining at a higher rate than their
colleagues from non-minority and middle or upper class
backgrounds.

The Langdell case method represents the primary pedagogical technique of American law
school professors.iS The originator of this method,
Christopher Columbus Langdell, contended that
the purpose of legal education was to teach students governing legal principles. 9 He argued that
his method provided a scientific means of achieving
this knowledge. The instructor utilizing this
method presents students with a mass of appellate

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

court decisions attempting to engage students in a

Political scientists have established that ajudge's
background characteristics affect his decisions in
certain cases.' 5 For example, Stuart Nagel observed
that a judge's ethnic or religious background provided a clue to understanding the judge's decisions
in certain types of cases.16 And, comparing the
sentencing propensities of'judges in Pittsburgh and
Minneapolis, Martin Levin found that some of the
disparities in sentences were attributable to social
background differences.17 Judges in Pittsburgh,
who came primarily from low income backgrounds
or from religious or ethnic minority groups, treated
criminal defendants on an individualistic basis.
Levin argues that because of their background,
Pittsburgh judges empathized with defendants and
attempted to give them a "break." In contrast,
Minneapolis judges, who were primarily from middle income, Northern European, Protestant backgrounds applied universalistic criteria in sentencing
criminal defendants.
Upon this basis, one might hypothesize that

Socratic dialogue. In this way, students learn to
analyze, distinguish, and synthesize cases. Theoretically, this 20method teaches students to "think like

14

G. COLE, POLITICS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF

CRIMINALJUSTICE (1973). See also A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967).

'5 Supra note 10.
I Nagel, Ethnic Affiliations andJudicialPropensities, 23 J.
POL. 614 (1961). Nagel, Judicial Background and Criminal
Cases, 53. J. CRIM. L.C. & P. S. 333 (1962).
17Levin, Urban Politics andJudicial Behavior, J. LEGAL.
STUD. 193-97 (1972).

a lawyer."'

Despite the predominance of the casebook
method, important qualitative differences exist in
American legal education. Law schools range from
the night and part-time proprietary schools, to a
middle level often associated with state and private
universities, and finally to a group of top ranked
schools such as Harvard and Yale.2 1 While re18
Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379,
391 (1952).
19 Note, Modern Legal Education, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
710 (1964).
'2 ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, PRELAW HANDBOOK 23 (1975).

2 Seymour WNarkov ranked 125 law schools on
the
basis of entering students' scores on the Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT. See, S. WARKOV, LAWYERS IN
THE MAKING (1965). In his study Harvard and Yale were
the top-ranked schools. More recently, Peter M. Blau and
Rebecca Z. Margulies asked law school deans throughout
the country to rank the top quality law schools in the
United States. Harvard, Yale, Columbia, University of
Michigan and The University of Chicago were consistently in the top five. America's Leading ProfessionalSchools,
CHANGE 21-27 (November, 1973); A Research Replication,
The Reputation of American Professional Schools, CHANGE
42-47 (Winter, 1974-75). See also Reed, Training for the
Public Profession of Law in NEW DIRECrIONS IN LEGAL

EDUCATION

eds. 1972).
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searchers may disagree over the criteria for ranking
law schools, they acknowledge that there are differences between proprietary or independent law
schools and non-proprietary schools or those affiliated with a state or private university.2
Typically, the instruction at the proprietary law
schools stresses knowledge of precedent rather than
the method of analysis. Such schools concentrate
primarily on local and concrete law, placing emphasis on preparing students for the state bar
examination.2 The method of instruction is generally straight lecturing, with little discussion of the
political, social, or economic aspects of a particular
case. Moreover, the faculty members tend to be
private practitioners who teach on a part-time
basis.
Ladinsky and Lortie found that the nature of
24
one's legal education affected career patterns.
Students from proprietary law schools were much
more likely to become solo practitioners than students from nonproprietary law schools. Additionally, law firms rarely recruited candidates from
proprietary law schools, on the assumption that
such candidates lacked the skills needed to handle
complex legal problems. Confirmation of these
findings is provided in a more recent study of the
Chicago Bar. Heinz, et. al., discovered that firm
lawyers were disproportionately drawn from elite
schools (Harvard and Yale), while solo practitioners were more often graduates of local schools
(Loyola, DePaul, John Marshall, Kent). s
Furthermore, Smigel observed that Wall Street
law firms placed considerable emphasis on recruiting students from particular law schools; students
educated in elite schools, were expected to have
obtained both the values and expertise needed to
represent .high status clients.2 6 This reasoning assumes that students assimilate the values and perspectives which are a part of their training. Draw22 A. BLAusrEIN & C. PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAW.
YER 176-79 (1954).

2 Lortie, Laymen to Lawmen: Law Schools, Careers, and
Professional Socialization, 29 HARv. EDuC. REV. 352

(1959).
24Lortie, supranote 23, at 357-59; Ladinsky, The Impact
of Social Backgrounds of Lawyers on Law Practiceand the Law,
16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1973). See also Ladinsky, Careers
of Lawyers, Law Practice,and Legal Institutions, 28 AM. SoC.

REV. 47 (1963).
2 Heinz, Laumann, Cappell, Halliday, and Schaalman, Diversity, Representation, and Leadership in an Urban

Bar: A First Report on a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 3 AM. BAR
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 717 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as 2Heinz].
6
E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER (1964).

ing an analogy to proprietary legal education, one
might hypothesize that the proprietary law school
with its emphasis on the rules of a particular
jurisdiction, would produce students with a myopic
perspective of the legal system. Such students may
fail to appreciate the more philosophical issues of
the adversary system and the rule of law. In contrast, students attending nonproprietary schools in
which analysis and method are stressed would be
more inclined to have a broader perspective of the
legal system and more likely to support the rule of
law and the adversary system.
What effect would these differences have on the
reported plea bargaining rates of prosecutors? One
might assume that prosecutors trained in the proprietary law schools would adapt more readily to
the norms of the criminal court organization than
prosecutors from nonproprietary schools. This is
particularly true since lawyers from nonproprietary
schools may view plea bargaining as conflicting
with the
ideals of the adversary system and the rule
27
of law.
Hypothesis 2: Prosecutors, who receive their legal educationfrom one of the proprietary law schools, will engage

in plea bargainingat a higher rate than their counterparts
from nonproprietarylaw schools.
Beyond his law school training, the lawyer's
work environment often shapes his behavior.s For
instance, Heinz, et. al., argue that one reason for
the overrepresentation of large firm lawyers in the
Chicago Bar Association, is that these law firms
encourage bar association membership. 29 This occurs because participants in most organizations
share certain norms or expectations about the behavior of individuals within the organization. In
the criminal court, researchers found that plea
bargaining norms supporting stability in the criminal court organization persist largely because these
norms are transmitted to new recruits."a
Socialization to the norms of the court occurs in
several ways. Beverly Blair Cook observed that
seminars for new judges are significant socializing
agents for federal district court judges.3 1 Carp and
Wheeler discovered that fellow judges, lawyers,
and members of the court staff also played a role
2' Comment, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining,

83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
28J.

SKOLNICK. JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL,

ch. 3

(1966).
2 Heinz, supra note 25, at 735.
30 CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW and POLrrICS 189-90 (G.

Cole, ed. 1976).

3i Cook, The Socialization of New FederalJudges:Impact on
District Court Business, 1971 WASH. L. Q. 253.
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in the socialization of newly appointed federal
judges.32 Additionally, appointees with prior judicial experience had fewer adjustment problems
than judges without this experience. Apparently,
the more experience one has within an organization, the more likely it is that he will adhere to the
norms of that organization.
Hypothesis 3: Prosecutors with more legal experience will
engage in plea bargainingat a higher rate than those with
less experience.
Milton Rokeach suggests that values serve as
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important for prosecutors to appear as formidable
opponents, it is more important that they demonstrate an ability to compromise and adapt to the
norms of the criminal court system. Moreover, plea
bargaining also benefits the politically ambitious
prosecutor or assistant, because it assures a high
conviction rate. A high conviction rate provides
evidence that the prosecutor is doing his job and
establishes a record of success which the prosecutor
can refer to in subsequent election campaigns.
Consequently, plea bargaining facilitates both personal and organizational goals.
Hypothesis 4: Prosecutors who adhere most strongly to
values such as efficiency and cooperation will engage in
plea bargainingat a higher rate than those prosectors who
support these values less strongly.
The following (Figure 1) is a graphic representation of the model utilized in this research. While

standards or criteria for one's actions. In Rokeach's
words, "To say that a person 'has a value' is to say
that he had an enduring belief that a specific mode
of conduct or end-state of existence is personally
modes of
and socially preferable to alternative
'
conduct or end-states of existence." 3
The values or preferences which govern the conduct of actors in the criminal court organization the focus of this research is on arrows 1, 2, 3 and 4,
include co-operation with colleagues and concern it is likely that the relationships indicated by 5, 6
for efficiency. According to Abraham Blumberg, and 7 are also significant. Each of the relationships
the criminal court organization "co-opts" its par- in 1, 2, 3 and 4 will be evaluated through correlaticipants so that they favor organizational values tional analysis. Additionally, the combined effect
such as efficiency and production.34 He maintains of the independent variables on reported plea barthat concern for administrative efficiency overrides gaining rates will be explored through the use of
concern for individual rights. In this context, Jer- multiple regression analysis.
ome Skolnick argues that most criminal attorneys
RESuLTs
will attempt to compromise.35 He notes that the
nature of American criminal justice encourages the
The hypothesis (H 1) was that prosecutors from
development of informal relationships between the ethnic and religious minority groups or lower status
prosecution and defense. Co-operation occurs be- backgrounds would be more likely to engage in
cause participants want to avoid conflict.
plea bargaining. Because these individuals are from
Co-operation also makes it possible for prosecu- less advantaged or minority backgrounds, it was
tors to advance personal goals. Both prosecutors hypothesized that they would sympathize with
and their assistants often view their positions as a defendants. Plea bargaining would provide a way
vehicle for gaining valuable trial experience before of individualizing justice and giving defendants "a
entering private practice.36 They are anxious to break". On the other hand, it was hypothesized
make contacts within the legal community which that prosecutors from non-minority or middle or
will later prove helpful. Some are also seeking to high status backgrounds would be less concerned
develop a professional reputation, because this fa- with individualizing justice and more concerned
cilitates a future private practice.3 7 While it is with strict adherence to the rule.of law. Therefore,
'3Carp & Wheeler, Sink or Swim: The Socialization of a

Federal DistrictJudge,21 J. PUB. L. 360 (1972).
3

M.

ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ATrrTUDES, AND VALUES

159-60 (1968).
'*

A.

BLUMBERG,

supra note 1, at 45-71; G. COLE,

POLITICS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL Jus-

193-204 (1973).
5Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J.
CONFLICT RFSOLUrION 52 (1967).
w P. Nardulli, Organizational Influences Upon Decision-Making in the Chicago Felony Court System 22-25
(Paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, Illinois) (May, 1975).
17 D. NEtBAUER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MIDDLE
AMERICA 51-52 (1975).
TrCF

to some extent, they would be less likely to engage
in plea negotiations than their colleagues.
Table 1 reports the association between two
social background variables (religion and national
origin) and the dependent variable (reported rate
3
of plea bargaining). 8 Eta in Table 1 ranges from
.06 to .11. Such low scores signify a very weak
as Religion and national origin are categorical variables. The categories utilized for analysis include: religion
(Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other, and no preference);
national origin (Northern and Western European, Southern and East European, Middle East, North American,
and other).
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Table I

0

SIMPIE ASSOCIATION EM PIZU10M' SOCIAL
BACKGW= AND REPM P=EA BARGAINN RXAES

Dependent

Religion

Variables

Bi

National

Father's

(eta)
Percentage of
all cases resolved throgh
plea bargaining

.Ii
(1 3 2 )a

.06
(121)

-. 03
(129)

aNafbers in parentheses are the naibers upn which the correlations are
calculated.

relationship between a prosecutor's religion or national origin and his reported rate of plea negotiation. Also present in Table 1 is the correlation
between the prosecutor's family status (operationalized as father's occupation) and his rate of plea
bargaining. The correlation (rho) is low (-.03),
is
which implies that the prosecutor's family status
9
not associated with his plea bargaining rate.
The statistical analyses demonstrate that knowledge of the prosecutor's religion, national origin, or
family status is not useful in predicting his rate of
plea bargaining. Prosecutors from low status or
minority and ethnic backgrounds do not bargain
more frequently than prosecutors from high status
or non-minority religious and ethnic backgrounds.
a7The measurement scale used for father's occupation
is a modified version of the one developed by Alba
Edwards. See A. EDWARDS, COMPARATIVE OCCUPATIONAL STATISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1943).

One explanation for this finding may be that many
prosecutors and judges, regardless of individual
origin, look to the upper-middle class as their reference group.' As Jacob states, "Many (prosecutors and judges) look forward to where they would
like their own children to be rather than backward
to where they spent their own childhoods.' 411 If this
is the case, then many prosecutors from minority
religious or ethnic backgrounds may be emulating
their higher status peers. Consequently, background variables would not explain a prosecutor's
propensity to engage in plea bargaining. These
results, therefore, do not support Hypothesis 1.
The next hypothesis (H 2) is that prosecutors
who received their legal training from proprietary
law schools would engage in plea bargaining more
4o H. JACOB,
41 Id, at 79.

supra note 8, at 78-79.
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Table 2
SIMPLE ASSOCIATICN FOR PRCSEC)t5RS'
LMAL E TION AND REPCM'M PLEA. BA
u FATES

Dependent Variable

Legai Education

(eta)
Perrentage of all cases
resolved through plea
bargaining

.10 a
(136)

aNurers in parentheses are the nuaters upm utdch the correlations are
calculated.
Table 3
SIMPLE ASSOCTIATICN EM PaCGERS'

EXPERIENC ANDrEPTRM= PLEA BA&N

Depen

t Variable

Percentage of all cases
resolved through the use
of plea bargaining

E

eri

(n =

RUME

(Pearson's R)
.07

13 5 )a

a!umbers in parentheses are the numbers upon which the correlations are
calculated.

frequently than prosecutors who attended nonproprietary law schools.4 2 Table 2 demonstrates the
strength of the relationship between type of law
school training and the prosecutor's reported rate
of bargaining. The reported statistic (eta = .10)
suggests that the prosecutor's legal training
(whether he attended a proprietary or nonproprietary law school) has a minor effect on his rate of
plea-negotiation. The fact that one's legal training
seems to have little, if any, influence on plea bargaining rates could be due in part to the realities
of the criminal justice system.
Critics of legal education argue that law students
receive a distorted picture of reality.3 Casebooks,
they assert, cannot convey the true nature of criminal law practice. Although knowledge of the criminal law is essential, experience provides one with
a greater understanding of the way the courts and
the prosecutor's office operate. Students, depending on their legal training, may subscribe to adver42 Proprietary law schools included in the survey were:
John Marshall, Kent I.I.T., and Detroit College of Law.
All other law schools were included in the nonproprietary
category.
43L. FORER, THE DEATH OF THE LAW 376-93 (1975).

sary ideals in varying degrees. But, once faced with
a system which functions'almost completely on the
basis of informal negotiations, the new recruit regardless of his training learns to adjust to the
system. Reality may override law school values and
perceptions and therefore, we find little support for
Hypothesis 2.
The correlation (Pearson's R) between the prosecutor's legal experience (operationalized as the
number of years in the practice of law) and his
reported rate of bargaining is presented in Table
3. It was hypothesized (H 3) that prosecutors with
more legal experience will engage in plea bargaining at a higher rate than those with less experience.
But, legal experience, as the low correlation implies
(.07), has almost no influence on the prosecutor's
rate of bargaining. There tends to be minimal
differences betweei the experienced prosecutor and
the inexperienced prosecutor in terms of the reported frequency of plea bargaining. This does not
imply that differences in the concessions a prosecutor is willing to make do not exist. For example,
Albert Alschuler argues that experienced and inexperienced prosecutors differ in respect to the
types of concessions they are willing to grant. Al-
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Table 4
ME T
SDVIU ASSO=TIt FOR PRSEnURS' A
ORGNIZATIONAL VAUES ANDIREW
PLEA BA
RATES

Dependent
Variables

Percentage of all
cases resolved throuh
plea bargaining

Index of
r

Inde of

.05
(1 35 )a

.12
(135)

aNumbers in parentheses are the nurs

upon whid the correlations are

schuler found that fear of losing a case as well as a
lack of confidence, often led inexperienced prosecutors to offer greater concessions than the merits
of a case justified."
Another factor which may account for the failure
of experience to predict increases or decreases in
plea bargaining rate is the lack of variation in the
independent variable. Because there were few experienced prosecutors in the survey, it is difficult
to determine the exact effect of experience on the
prosecutor's propensity to bargain.
The failure of social background, law school
training, and experience to predict plea bargaining
rates is not particularly surprising. Evidence from
studies dealing with the effect of social background
variables on judicial decision-making is also inconclusive.4 5 In most instances, background variables

were only indirectly related to individual behavior
and were actually the precursors of certain attitudes and values which are more directly influential in predicting behavior.46 This appears to be
true for prosecutors as well. As Eisenstein and
Jacob point out, background characteristics of
prosecutors and defense attorneys influence their
experiences and perceptions, and may indirectly
influence the disposition of criminal cases. However, the norms and actions of the collective courtroom work group (prosecutors and defense attorneys and
judges) mute the role of these personal
47
biases.
The data arrayed in Table 4 show the relationship between the prosecutor's support or non-support for efficiency in the courtroom, co-operation
with colleagues, and plea bargaining iates.4 It was

"Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 110-11 (1968).

MURPHY &

' One characteristic recognized as influencing a
judge's decision is religion. See S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL
PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPEcrIVE 227-36

46 Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Court of
Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 496 (1975).
47J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE 10- 11
(1977).
4 The independent variables, efficiency and cooperation, represent an index which measures the extent to

(1969); Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Court of
Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 374 (1966);
Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the
South, 26 J. POL. 338 (1964). Partisan identification also

J. TANENHAUS,

THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAw

103-12 (1972).

which prosecutors support these values. The indices are

has been found to be associated with a judge's voting

based on answers to a series of Likert scale questions

behavior. See, Jaros and Canon, Dissent on State Supreme
Court: The Differential Effect of the Characteristicsof Judges,
15 MIDWESTJ. POL. Sci. 332 (1971); Ulmer, The Political
Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11 J. PUB. L.
352 (1963). See also Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges'
Voting: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 62 AM. POL. SCL
REv. 57 (1969); Feeley, Another Look at the "Party Variable"
in Judicial Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Michigan
Supreme Court, 4 POLITY 91 (1971); Nagel, Multiple Correlations ofJudicialBackgrounds andDecisions, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 258 (1974). For a general discussion of the use of
social background variables as predictors of judicial decisions, see, S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL
COURrS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 174-78 (1976); W.

dealing with efficiency and cooperation. These questions
were factor analyzed in order to determine which best
measured the underlying values of efficiency and cooperation. The following two items (which loaded between
.631 and .592 on the first factor) were selected for the

index of cooperation: 1) the real job of the defense
attorney is to negotiate a plea for his client. 2) the real
job of the prosecutor is to negotiate with the defense
attorney. These two items (which loaded between .421
and .482) were selected for the efficiency index: 1) Pros-

ecutors (public defenders) need to dispose of their cases
as quickly as possible. 2) The efficient handling of cases
is of foremost importance in the criminal justice system.

On the basis of their answers to these questions on
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hypothesized (H 4) that as adherence to such values gaining because they provide a method of settling
increased, the prosecutor's reported rate of bargain- cases with minimum conflict and expenditure of
ing would also increase.
resources. Such policies may reflect support for
The correlations (Pearson's R) reveal that sup- efficiency and co-operation, but the linkage beport or non-support for efficiency has almost no tween these values and plea bargaining rates may
effect on plea bargaining rates, but that support be indirect, thereby accounting for the low correfor co-operation has a somewhat greater influence lations reported.
Thus far, the correlational analysis demonstrates
on the frequency of prosecutorial plea bargaining.
Bargaining rates increase as support for co-opera- that each of the independent variables has a slight
tion increases, although the correlation is rather effect on reported plea bargaining rates. One shortweak.
coming of such bivariate analysis is that it does not
Neither organizational value is particularly help- allow the researcher to account for the simultaneful in predicting the frequency of prosecutorial ous effect of several independent variables on the
plea bargaining. Several factors could explain this: dependent variable. Nor does it permit the refirst, support for co-operation is a goal which pros- searcher to hold constant other independent variecutors are reluctant to articulate, largely because ables which can affect the initial relationship under
the public views this goal as illegitimate.4 9 Thus, analysis. One way of ascertaining the collective
the responding prosecutors may have been reluc- effect of these variables is through a multiple
tant to indicate the extent of their support for co- regression analysis. This mode of analysis also gives
operation. Second, these values could be only in- the researcher an idea of the unique effect of each
controlling for all
directly related to the rate of negotiation: support independent variable, while
52
for such values may encourage the development of other independent variables.
The results of a multiple regression analysis are
policy guidelines for handling cases which have a
more direct impact on reported bargaining rates. revealed in Table 5. The four independent variFor example, Eckart and Stover noted that public ables used in the analysis were: adherence to codefenders and prosecutors followed certain rules of operation, father's occupation, experience, and
thumb in the disposition of felony cases. ° First proprietary law school attendance.5 The squared
offenders might have their charges reduced to mis- multiple correlation coefficient (R square) gives
demeanors, or defendants facing multiple felony the researcher an indication as to how much of the
charges may automatically have all but one of the variation in the dependent variable is accounted
charges dismissed. Although the rules will vary for by the independent variables in the analysis.
depending on the jurisdiction, each case is treated The R squared in this instance is .06. In other
according to the established rule for that particular
words, these particular independent variables excategory of cases.
plain about six percent of the variance in proseEisenstein and Jacob discovered that policy cutors' reported plea bargaining rates. Thus, the
norms on plea negotiation also existed both in the
52 Several assumptions are required for such an analCook County State's Attorney's office and in Deysis. The assumptions are: 1) a linear relationship exists
troit (Wayne County).5 ' Failure to comply with
official policy in Cook County resulted in discipli- between the independent and the dependent variables,
nary action. Violators were often called to the 2) the data are normally distributed and the independent
variables are not substantially correlated with one ansupervisor's office and required to explain their other. See, F. KELLEY, D. BEGGS, & K. MCNEIL, REbehavior.
SEARCH DESIGN IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: MULSuch policies would encourage more plea bar- TIPLE REGRESSION APPROACH (1969).
" The variable proprietary law school attendance was
efficiency and co-operation, the prosecutors received a used in the regression analysis as a dummy variable.
cumulative score. Low scores indicate weak adherence to Scores of 1 were assigned if a respondent attended a
the values, while high scores indicate strong adherence to proprietary law school and 0 if he did not. The use of a
the values. Medium range scores represent a neutral dummy variable allows a researcher to utilize a nominal
category. The Pearson's correlation between efficiency level variable in the regression analysis. For a discussion
and co-operation is (.16) which indicates that these indi- of the use of dummy variables, see, H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL
STATISTICS, 498-501 (1972). Father's occupation is an
ces49represent two different value dimensions.
ordinal level scale. For a discussion of ordinal and diJ. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 47, at 28.
5o Eckart & Stover, Public Defenders and Routinized Criminal Defense Processes, 51 J. URB. L. 665 (1974).
'I J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, supra note 47, at chs. 5

&6.

chotomized variables in regression analysis see Tanenhais. et. aL., The Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction-Cue
Theor, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (G. Schubert ed.
1963).
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External Forces
Political, social,
economic forces in
state/locality

A model of the dispositional process in the criminal court.

combined influence of these particular independent variables on prosecutorial bargaining rates is
not particularly high.
Also reported in Table 5 are the standardized
regression coefficients (Betas). These demonstrate
the relative contribution of each independent variable, while controlling for the other independent
variables. Experience is the most important variable affecting the prosecutor's rate of bargaining,
but it is only slightly more important than proprietary law school attendance and support for cooperation. Father's occupation has the least effect
on the reported rate of bargaining.
CONCLUSION

Does a prosecutor's background or support for
organizational values influence his plea bargaining
rate? To some extent, yes. However, given the large
amount of unexplained variance in the dependent
variable, it is obvious that additional factors account for variation in reported plea bargaining
rates. Certainly, additional research is needed.
Lawrence Mohr argues that the criminal courts
can be better understood if one looks at the behavior of the participants within the framework of a

decision-making paradigm.54 Following Mohr's
suggestion, the model in Figure 2 represents a
general outline of the various factors which influence the decision to go to trial or to negotiate a
plea.
Social scientists often construct models to assist
them in theory-building. A model, according to
Lawrence Mayer, is an analytical system that is
"developed or constructed so that the logical relationships between its elements correspond in logical
form to the relationships between a set of elements
in the real world."' Models then, simplify reality
and, in performing this function, allow researchers
to isolate certain variables for analysis. Moreover,
they serve a heuristic function, suggesting new
relationships which logically ought to exist. When
these relationships have survived empirical testing,
"the task of logically integrating the lawlike propositions generated from the model into theory is
facilitated."56
M Mohr, Organizations, Decisions, and Courts, 10 LAw &
Soc'y REV. 621 (1976).
5 L. MAYER, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL INQUIRY 52

(1972).
5

L.

MAYER,

supra note 55, at 53.
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The model in Figure 2 depicts the institutional settled through a negotiated plea. This judgment,
and environmental factqrs which affect the prose- in a sense, acts as a filter through which attorneys
cutor's decision to plea bargain or go to trial. The process information surrounding individual cases.
findings of this research, as well as that of Cole, Often this judgment may simply reflect the established policy for disposing of particular cases. For
Skolnick, Blumberg, Jacob and Eisenstein, suggest
instance, some prosecutor's offices refuse to bargain
that institutional variables such as the participants'
social background, education, values, ability, sen- in certain types of cases-drug cases or carrying a
tencing propensities and goals,
are indirectly pre- concealed weapon. This type of policy would have
57
an influence on case disposition.
dictive of case disposition.
Participants in the decision-making process must
Additional institutional factors which are sigweigh institutional factors such as individual valnificant include the circumstances surrounding a
particular case, i.e., the strength of the state's evi- ues, goals, and abilities along with the circumdence; the seriousness of the crime, felony or mis- stances of the case and the defendant's willingness
demeanor; personal characteristics of the defend- to accept a particular agreement. All of these facant; judicial pressure to clear the court docket; and tors, as well as external factors, are considered in
making a final decision on trial or negotiation. Past
the defendant's willingness to accept the plea
experience influences an attorney's estimates of a
agreement.
case outcome as well. Moreover, such past experiAdministrative factors also effect the disposition
process. Variables such as the volume of cases ences serve as the basis for developing policy guidelines on case disposition. Thus, the interaction
handled in a particular jurisdiction, the length of
among those involved both directly (prosecutors
time that a case has been on the docket, the number
of cases per attorney, and the presence of a profes- and defense attorneys) and indirectly (judges and
sional court administrator all influence disposi- defendants) results in a decision on case disposition.
The model requires several caveats. First, it needs
tions. In addition to these administrative factors,
refinement
to determine more specifically what the
environmental or external forces also play an indirect role in determining the disposition of cases. circumstances are for trial disposition rather than
For example, the nature of the criminal law (state negotiating a plea. In other words, it must consider
which of the institutional or environmental factors
or federal) or the social, political, and economic
characteristics of a particular state or locality, are are weighed more heavily in the final decision to
go to trial or to negotiate. Second, further testing
all variables which potentially affect the operation
of the model should take into consideration differof the criminal court. Researchers have generally
tended to ignore this aspeci of the model, but it is ences in plea bargaining styles. It must question
important nonetheless. Courts do not operate in a whether the kinds of concessions which are made
vacuum; they are best understood in an environ- in particular jurisdictions (charge reduction, sentence reduction, or modification of conviction lamental context. Thus, it is necessary for researchers
to examine the effect of crime rate, public opinion, bel) effect the decision to negotiate or go to trial.
or media pressure on the criminal court operation. Moreover, researchers should not assume that the
model operates in the same fashion in all jurisdicThe model suggests that it is the interaction
tions. Comparisons across jurisdictions are necesamong the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge
sary in order to determine the common factors
(indirectly) which determines the final outcome of
the case. Attorneys assimilate the available infor- which influence case disposition. This model provides a starting point for future research, for it
mation and attempt to estimate the likely outcome
identifies a number of relationships which need
of a case; that is, what will occur if the case goes to
trial as opposed to what will happen if the case is empirical testing. Proceeding in this fashion will
allow researchers to develop a theory of plea bar57See notes 1, 14, 35 and 36 supra.
gaining.

